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ABSTRACT
The present article is a preliminary study that attempts to explain how the events in San Mateo (then part
of the old Manila Province) during the early American colonial period (1899-1901) encouraged among its
people the forgetting of the war against American aggression. Forgetting in the context of this research
pertains to the act of letting go of the overt resistance and accepting the new colonial order under the
American regime. Drawing from Reynaldo C. Ileto’s study on the protected zone, this study reiterates the
idea that the Americans immediately forged forgetting at the onset of their occupation in the town of San
Mateo—and this was achieved through contested yet deemed legitimate colonial policies like military
surveillance operations to maintain the American brand of peace and order in the protected zone. The
discourse will be supported by the theoretical frames laid out by T. Ruanni F. Tupas on the nature of
historical forgetting in the Philippines, and his take on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition as a
form of forgetting. The perspective this study advances belongs to the realm of local history.
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Remembering the forgotten narratives of
the Filipino-American War (1899-1913) in
micro settings has been explored in recent
studies such that it is now possible to get a
glimpse of war memories in various
provinces or towns (Ileto; Legarda, Jr; May;
Mojares; Scott; Veneracion). However,
tracing the origin of forgetting on such a
smaller scale has been a subject rarely
examined. Undoubtedly, the discrepancy
in time and historiographical problems
contributed to the perpetuation of
collective amnesia, albeit a phenomenon as
complex as this was also spurred by social
and political events that transpired while
the war was locally being fought. As the
historian Resil B. Mojares proves, this is
more of “a question of colonial memory"
aside from temporal distance from the past
(1). Complete and proper remembering
today, that is to say linking the past to the
present, may thus be fulfilled when the
sources of forgetting have been scrutinized
as well. This “problem” should be
addressed by exploring the marginalized
and buried scenes of the Filipino-American
War on local levels (Ileto “Friendship and
Forgetting” 6).

parts. The first part discusses the
theoretical frames of the study. The second
part applies the framework by focusing on
the protected zone in San Mateo,
particularly the surveillance operations of
American soldiers to maintain peace and
order. Since the current study is limited to
the American production of forgetting at
the early phase of their occupation, the
researcher culled the sources mostly from
official U.S. Army records.1 The actual
impact or the gravity of such an attempt on
the Filipino mentality may be covered in
future studies. The third part expounds on
the complex nature of forgetting by
discussing the surrender of Gen. Licerio
Geronimo, the military commander in San
Mateo. Because of space constraints, the
author limits the study only to the said
subtopics without ignoring other stimuli
that might have instigated the forgetting of
the Filipino-American War in the town of
San Mateo, Rizal.2

Misrecognition and Forgetting in
the context of the Filipino-American
War
In his article entitled "Bourdieu, Historical
Forgetting, and the Problem of English in
the Philippines," T. Ruanni F. Tupas
painted in broad strokes the nature and
politics of historical forgetting in the
context of the nascent Filipino-American
relationship.
He
suggests
three
fundamental elements: 1) forgetting as
collective; 2) forgetting as structured; and
3) forgetting as socially practiced. The first
indicates that people belonging to a group

Forgetting in the context of this article
pertains to the act of letting go of the overt
resistance and accepting the new colonial
order under the American regime. The
study utilizes as a case study the local
experiences of San Mateo, then part of the
old Manila Province (now part of Rizal
Province), during the early American
colonial period (1899-1901) to concretize its
existence. The article is divided into three
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or society forget or remember collectively
despite
individual
differences
and
background. A "conceptual map" of public
consciousness or perception of the past, in
general, is still possible through analyzing
the selective history instituted by people.
The second reveals the power relations
between colonizers and the colonized, the
inequities across structures that caused
historical and social issues (e.g., who writes
schoolbooks used in American-ran public
schools?). The third extrapolates the role of
society in connecting or disconnecting the
past from the present (52-55)—it is the
society that hones, verifies, preserves, or
neglects individual memories (Halbwachs
43).

Bourdieu’s
(1930-2002)
concept
misrecognition to answer this (55-58).

of

Misrecognition refers to “the everyday and
dynamic social process” wherein a
“situation, process or action” is not
recognized as such (its true nature is
ignored) because it does not conform to the
tendency,
disposition,
or
standard
(Habitus) of the person facing it (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 168; James 100). Here, the
adage "in the eyes of the beholder" matters
because legitimization of social order or
power relation becomes subjective, and
they are "perceived not for what they
objectively are" (Thapar-Björkert, Samelius
and Sanghera 149). In practice, it is a subtle
social strategy of exercising the power of
those in authority to preserve the social
inequities that generate various forms of
social
dominations.
In
addition,
misrecognition is a form of symbolic
violence or the kind of violence propelled
by concealed mechanisms of dominance.
This violence is more psychological as it
involves silent aggression, or the power of
those in authority to impose their mental
schemes
of
classification
and
representation upon those devoid of power
without using actual or physical brutality.
Examples of this are discourses, laws,
policies, and invented traditions, to name a
few, that "naturalize" or "legitimize" the
structure and keep the relations away from
conscious interrogation. In turn, this
enables the people to accept willingly or
forcibly the problematic issues besetting
the society ("accepting the world as it is").
Therefore, the hidden and subtle

Tupas' article centers on how the said
nature served as the backbone of burying
the memories of the Filipino-American
War, with the English language as the
primary tool. In the context of the war, the
language policy in education, as Tupas
notes, was imbued with "power and class
dimensions" to convince the Filipinos about
American benevolence (48-51). However,
he admits that proposing new evidence of
the causes of historical forgetting is not his
goal (Tupas situated forgetting through
Reynaldo C. Ileto's study on the
accomplishment
of
the
Schurman
Commission). The strength of Tupas' study
lies in the analysis of this central question:
why the colonized society collectively
welcomed the idea of social change, and
how inequities across structures were
sustained?
Tupas
mustered
Pierre
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mechanisms will not be complete without
the active complicity of people who
unconsciously receive the violence.
Misrecognition hence crept in when the
people "being violated" give consent, cease
to resist, and accept the [new] order
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 24, 167-168;
James 100; Jung 108; Tupas 55-58).

The language policy, however, was not the
only misrecognition we can observe during
the war. Aside from this, it was also
obvious who controlled the flow of ideas,
knowledge, justice, identity, and history, to
name a few, during the entire American
regime, which, to some extent, was
accepted by some Filipinos. Through
words, a manifestation of language in
relation to power in Bourdieusian terms
(e.g., civilizing mission, manifest destiny,
white
man's
burden,
benevolent
assimilation), translated into policies of
modernity
and
development
(e.g.,
sanitation and infrastructure programs),
which were protected from identified
"outlaws" (e.g., through Sedition Law,
Brigandage Act, Reconcentration Law, and
Flag Law), and preserved by way of
invented
traditions
(e.g.,
imposed
American public holidays in the
Philippines), the Americans managed to
establish and maintain a new society under
their tutelage with the active complicity of
Filipinos. All of these were "invisible
powers" that generated symbolic violence
and were "misrecognized as such and
thereby
recognized
as
legitimate"
(Thompson 23).

The irony of the imposition of language
policy during the Filipino-American War
can now be understood using Bourdieu's
misrecognition. To think that this was
implemented while at war, such "legitimate
"and, at first glance, "neutral" policy
entailed attempts to sideline the Filipino
fight for independence—the essence of the
Filipino-American War. More importantly,
a drastic social transformation, which was
done collectively, anchored in the structure
of the society, and socially practiced, was
achieved through the English language
because it disconnected the Filipinos from
their foundations as a nation by making
them Americanized colonials. This action
was, of course, pursued through the
complicity of some Filipinos who adopted
the idea of "uncivilized" natives while
recognizing the need for American
tutelage. In this sense, misrecognition is a
form of forgetting. The teaching of the
English language misrecognized the
unfortunate realities of the FilipinoAmerican War—the Philippine Republic
existed, and the Filipino war of
independence
transpired,
but
the
American authorities reduced these into
non-entity (Tupas 55-58).

The present article shares the idea of Tupas
on the concept of misrecognition (or the
tacit non-recognition of the true nature of a
contested situation, process, or action), and
how it inspired the forgetting (done
collectively, structured with power
relations, and socially practiced) of the
Filipino-American War. However, this
study deviates from language policy by
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examining the following: 1.)
the
misrecognition in the symbolic violence
produced
by
military
surveillance
operations to maintain peace and order,
and 2.) the surrender of Geronimo in San
Mateo and his subsequent collaboration
with the Americans. The analysis will be
substantiated using Ileto’s approach on his
studies about the protected zone in the
towns of Tiaong and Candelaria, Quezon
Province (“Knowing America’s Colony”
29-32; “Colonial Wars” 113; “Friendship
and Forgetting” 12-13; Knowledge and
Pacification 94-101), and apply it to San
Mateo as a similar phenomenon of the
American production of forgetting existed
in these towns. The perspective this study
advances belongs to the realm of local
history.

geographical feature and its proximity to
Manila (see appendix).

Zone

In theory, a protected zone was envisioned
to secure the safety of the people from war
damages while serving as a venue for
developments espoused by the Benevolent
Assimilation policy (Gates 210, 260). In
practice, this administration system sought
to weaken the Filipino military forces by
cutting out the means of supply they could
derive from citizens of a town. Ileto
contends that a protected zone, which was
a "concentration camp"3 much like during
the World War 2, was part of the scorched
earth tactic of the Americans meant to
implement the strategy of knowing,
ordering, and disciplining (Knowledge and
Pacification 94-95; "Colonial Wars" 112-113).
It was a scheme of domination, Ileto asserts,

However, the town could not maintain its
lines of defense against the Americans
during the war. After three attempts, the
American forces captured San Mateo on 19
December 1899 (see appendix). Though
they experienced setbacks in establishing a
civil government, the Americans organized
a town center under American protection
with the help of Filipino members of Partido
Federaslista (U.S. War Department, Annual
Reports of the War Department 202). In
addition, “skirmish lines” were delineated
to separate the “inside” (town center) from
the “outside” (areas of the Filipino military
forces) (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippine
Islands 1756). The area that operates under
the American authority is what we call the
Policing the American Protected "Protected Zone."

Twenty-three kilometers (23 km) from the
City of Manila, the town of San Mateo lies
in the northern domain of the present-day
Rizal Province, within the Marikina Valley.
It is bounded by the municipality of
Montalban
(now
officially
named
Rodriguez) from the north, by Marikina
City from the south, and by Quezon City
from the west. The mountain of San Mateo,
a portion of the Sierra Madre known to
locals as Mt. Mataba, is located on the
eastern side, while the San Mateo River,
which is linked to the Marikina River, flows
at the western side of the town. Seven
battles occurred in San Mateo during the
Filipino-American War due to this
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through
"fixing space, establishing
boundaries, preventing the movement of
people in and out, enabling…surveillance,
and inducing…to want and to do what the
occupation army wanted" ("Knowing
America's Colony" 30). Therefore, a
protected zone was also a bastion of
misrecognition because the Americans
controlled the flow and actualization of
ideas while making it appear normal
despite its contested nature during the war.
As a venue where unquestioned power
relations were apparent between the
dominant and the dominated, concepts like
peace and order must be aligned with the
ideals of the Americans. In particular,
peace and order meant allegiance to the
Americans.

MacArthur, these men, who were
attending their everyday chores and
disguising as peaceful civilians, allegedly
attacked the American headquarters in San
Mateo and killed Cpl. Wm B. Clintsman
and injured Pvt. Charles Carter, both
belonging to the 27th Infantry, U.S.
Volunteers. Submitting themselves to the
case filed by the Americans, or complicity
to the American justice system, all
respondents pleaded not guilty, but the
court convicted these inhabitants and
initially sentenced them to suffer the death
penalty. After reviewing the case, the court
commuted the punishment to 15 years of
imprisonment at Presidio de Manila (U.S.
Senate, Charges of Cruelty 115-116).
The
Americans
continued
their
investigation, or vendetta, against Filipino
soldiers in Marikina Valley on 25 February
1901, the exact date when the court
convicted the people mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. This operation aimed
to arrest Gen. Licerio Geronimo, the
appointed overall commander of the First
and Second Zone of Manila Defense by
Aguinaldo's government, and his men who
were allegedly hiding in residential areas to
recruit soldiers. Here, Macabebe Scouts
commanded by Lt. Dennis P. Quinlan, the
same American officer who ordered the
"honorary" burial of Gen. Gregorio del Pilar
(Karnow 159), were involved in the
combined direct physical and concealed
symbolic violence (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the
Philippine Islands 1753-1765; Storey and
Codman 54-59).

This part narrates two distinct yet related
specific cases of misrecognition in the
protected zone in San Mateo: 1) the
imprisonment of accused inhabitants and
2) the incident that occurred in Montalban
on 25 February 1901 to apprehend
suspected insurgents. After the battle that
ensued on 24 August 1900, one of the four
military encounters after the fall of the
town (see appendix), townsfolks were
arrested and put on trial. These were
Gaudencio Año, Simeon de la Cruz, Juan
Mariano, Alexandro San Pedro, Nicolas
Asuncion, Pedro Florencio, Ambrosio de
los Santos, Valentin Felix, Eugenio Ramos,
Marcelo Ygnacio, Romualdo de la Cruz,
and other 26 natives of San Mateo.
According to General Order No. 38 signed
on 25 February 1901 by the American
Military Governor Maj. Gen. Arthur
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The abuses were exposed when an
"outraged citizen" sent a complaint letter to
Maj. Gen. MacArthur about the crimes
committed by Macabebe Scouts, who
implemented the search process. The
General addressed the issue by sending to
the crime scene an investigating body
headed by Maj. Frank B. McKenna,
Inspector-General of the Department of
Northern Luzon. Locals were hesitant at

first to collaborate. However, upon
securing from McKenna the confidentiality
of the case, inhabitants of San Mateo and
Montalban led by local leaders opted to tell
everything they knew about the case and
other incidents of overt violence committed
by men-in-uniform. Below is the summary
of testimonies collated by McKenna (U.S.
Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands 17501765).

TABLE 1: Testimonies about the Abuses Committed by the Macabebe Scouts
Name of Complainant

Age

Date when the violence
occurred

Complaint

Policarpio Cristi
Martin Anastacio
Paul [sic] Concepcion
Estaban Samaldi
Dauraniao/Laureano de la Cruz (Vice local
president of Montalban)
Saturnina de la Cruz
Roberta Magat (widowed)
Valentino [sic] Anesito
Francisco Resurestion [sic]
Eccel Memoracion

40
20
60
45

17 February 1901
25 February 1901
25 February 1901
25 February 1901

Beaten and arrested
Beaten and robbed
His 18-year-old daughter was raped.
Beaten and arrested

35

25 February 1901

Arrested and robbed

18
45
18
no data
30

25 February 1901
25 February 1901
25 February 1901
25 February 1901
25 February 1901

Valerma/Guillerma de la Cruz

18

25 February 1901

Emiliano de la Cruz
Petra Mendiola

26
12

25 February 1901
25 February 1901

Angel Domingo

20

25 February 1901

Macaria San Pascual (wife of Captain Tino)

70

25 February 1901

Francisco Caliztro [sic] (daughter of Captain
Tino)

34

25 February, 1901

Ismael Amado (local president of San Mateo)

no data

25 February, 1901

Victorina Bautista

no data

25 February 1901

Juan Torres

60

27 February 1901

Madia de la Cruz (a businesswoman)
Segunda Marcella
Unnamed old woman

30
20
no data

28 February 1901
28 February 1901
1 March 1901

Raped
Raped
Raped
Raped
Robbed
Raped by Macabebe Scouts three
times within one night.
Violated his pregnant wife; Robbed
Raped
Verified the physical violence and
robbery to a man named Catalino
Calixto (known as Kapitan Tino) by
the arresting group
Saw the arrest and robbery to Catalino
Calixto
Attested the arrest, robbery of P200.00,
and killing of Catalino Calixto
Believed the veracity of all complaints;
Confirmed the complaints of George
[sic] Bautista, Candido Cruz, and
Jelacio Desiderio—all were beaten and
robbed.
Threatened and arrested
Extorted and tried to rape his
daughter-in-law.
Pounded, robbed, and threatened
Raped
Victim of extortion

SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines of the
United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1750-1765.
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The Symbolic violence here stems from the
fact that American soldiers, performing
surveillance operations, assumed full
authority in the process of making
"legitimate pronouncement and naming"—
or the power to investigate a crime, tag the
enemies of the law, prosecute the
presumed enemies, and project as the
embodiment of justice (Loader 1-18). The
misrecognized violence was the imposition
of such authority despite the existence of a
Filipino government. Taken for granted as
"natural" and "universal", the words or
judgments of American soldiers appeared
"legitimate" within the protected zone. No
matter how subjective they may seem, who

would challenge a justice system vis-à-vis
schemes of perception imposed by the
Americans when it was based on written
laws/orders while being projected as a
weapon of "good" against "evil"?
(Bourdieu, "The Force of Law" 838; GarcíaVillegas 382). A crucial point in our
discussion is that this kind of
misrecognition existed throughout the first
decade of the American colonial period,
while the Filipino-American War was still
happening.4
Below are the pronouncements of
American officers involved in the incident
on 25 February 1901:

TABLE 2: Pronouncements of American Officers about the Abuses
Name of American Officers

Testimony

Capt. F. H. Cameron

Complaints of local townsfolk were fabricated and exaggerated. With regards
to the death of a man known as Kapitan Tino, he argued, as reported to him,
that this man was struck, not killed, because of "resisting the guard." (nanlaban
in Filipino)

Capt. Duncan Henderson

States that "he knows from his own knowledge nothing of the reported acts of
aggression of the Macabebes."

1st Lt. Dennis P. Quinlan

He declared that "at all times the utmost effort has been made to prevent any
trouble with the people of the town." He insisted that he was present on the
street in the vicinity and saw no case of ill-treatment of natives or any outrages
committed.

2nd Lt. Charles R. Lloyd, Jr.

In his opinion, "the Macabebe soldiers have conducted themselves
becomingly toward the people of the town… he saw no act of violence."

Sgt. Walter F. Malone

Sworn that "Macabebes have committed no outrages and are well behaved.”

Cpl. Benjamin A, Brown

States that "Macabebes were well behaved."

SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearing before the Committee on the
Philippines of the United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1750-1751.
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McKenna’s verdict on the complaints
exemplified misrecognition. He said that
“there can be no question that this raid on
the town was legitimate if it had been
executed under the proper control of
officers” (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the
Philippine Islands 1757). McKenna did not
vindicate his comrades. He believed crimes
were committed and American officers and
Macabebe Scouts should be held liable. He
was appalled by the apparent lack of
investigations into the reported abuses of
his brothers in the military. However, his
views were insignificant in light of our
discussion. His authority to come up with
authoritative decisions on the subject
matter and his imposed image as the
harbinger of peace and order to the town
misrecognized the discourse on legitimacy
of authority.

abuses (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippine
Islands 1762-1765).
Unfortunately, as opposed to McKenna's
decision that had a partial tone,
Thompson's judgment threw all the blame
on Filipinos (both Macabebe Scouts and
townsfolk). His accusation of abusing the
word “rape” was a classic example of
victim-blaming toward the complainants.
Moreover, the issue of "command and
responsibility" to the Macabebe Scouts,
which the Americans assumed, was
ignored (Storey and Codman 58-59).
Nevertheless, Thompson assured the
people that the case "would be pushed to
the end" and "justice will be meted out to all
offenders" (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the
Philippine Islands 1765). Thus, Thompson's
verdict became final and executory. The
case was closed sine die.

The same misrecognition was carried out
by Col. J. Milton Thompson when he
reviewed the case. Two weeks after the
fateful night, he released his biased verdict.
These are as follows: 1) The Macabebe
Scouts indeed killed a man known as
Kapitan Tino (Catalino Calixto); 2)
Macabebe Scouts committed robbery and
outrages on the night of 25 February 1901;
3) The word "Rape" in the context of the
incident is not accurate because although
they retaliated, women involved in the
complaint consented the sexual acts of
some men; 4) No American commissioned
officers were involved in the crimes of the
Macabebe Scouts; and 5) Macabebes and
Tagalogs have bitter ethnic rivalry since
time immemorial, thus came the physical

However, what made this symbolic
violence seem a success was the complicity
of townsfolk, local elites, and citizens alike.
McKenna interviewed 50 complainants,
but an estimated total number of 200
individuals approached him and vouched
to tell the whole story (U.S. Senate, Affairs
in the Philippine Islands 1758). The same
people who communicated with Mckenna
also contacted Thompson to testify (U.S.
Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands 17621765). With constant persuasion of local
elites, Filipinos embraced the Americanprojected heroic reputation as peacemakers
and enemies of "demonized" forces and
rallied behind the so-called "legitimate"
investigating body because it was
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"neutrally" designed as "normal." No
wonder when asked again about the
atrocities that occurred on the night of 25
February 1901, local leaders assured the
Americans that the incidents "were now in
the past,” hence the “matter be dropped”
(U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands
1765; emphasis added).
What does it mean to drop the case and
consider it an incident in the past? At first
glance, the people of San Mateo and
Montalban wanted to forget the painful
past. Therefore, it is not a surprise that no
one talks about this incident today because
the inhabitants opted not to transmit their
tragic memories to future generations
(Ileto, Colonial Wars" 116).
Besides,
Filipinos received unfair justice despite
their cooperation with their new
conquerors to restore peace and order. On
the one hand, arrested Filipino soldiers
were imprisoned, as in the case of Filipinos
allegedly involved in the 24 August 1900
Battle, and made sure that they would
experience the full wrath of the law.
However, on the other hand, American
officers got away with their crimes; some
were even promoted, as in the case of the
promotion of Lt. Quinlan to Captain of the
5th Cavalry (Storey and Codman 58; Blount
246; Woolard 84).5
A deeper analysis would explain, on the
other hand, why forgetting occurred—the
erasure of memory coincided with the
pronouncement that the case was closed.
At the same time, the people received
assurance of peace, order, and prosperity

from the Americans under the Benevolent
Assimilation Policy. The soldiers acting as
police force became essential to this goal
since they would act as the benefactors of
people who were incessantly fighting for
independence since the revolution against
Spain in 1896 (Salazar, 3-8; Guiwa 48-55),
and bothered by the prospect of famine
because of the interruption in Agricultural
activities (U.S. Senate, Affairs in the
Philippine Islands 1759). Furthermore, as
the cholera epidemic ravaged the town in
the first decade of the American colonial
regime, the Americans became agents of
public health and sanitation by conducting
house-to-house inspection, disinfection,
and strict implementation of quarantine
(U.S. War Department, Third Annual
Report 323-324), while serving as providers
of aids to Filipinos. (U.S. War Department,
Fourth Annual Report 904). With these, the
complicity of local leaders was crucial
because they would convince the ordinary
people that no salvation exists outside the
American tutelage; like in the case of
Arturo Dancel, future Governor of Rizal
Province in 1902, who pleaded for
American support to ward off famine (U.S.
War Department, Fourth Annual Report
904). Therefore, with the prospect of
receiving rewards from the Americans as
opposed to the destruction caused by the
war and fear for retribution of combatants,
it is not difficult to fathom that accepting
the new order and forgetting the
conspicuous fight against American
aggression,
or
misrecognizing
the
discourse on the legitimacy of authority in
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the protected zone, were prioritized by the
people of San Mateo because it meant
sustaining life. Hence, forgetting pertains
to the act of withdrawing the burden
caused
by
overt
resistance
and
accommodating the new conquerors to
survive (Ileto, Colonial Wars” 116).

Surrender and Collaboration of
Gen. Licerio Geronimo
The pacification campaigns in Marikina
Valley reached their height when Filipino
military leaders began surrendering to the
Americans in March 1901. With the help of
Partido Federalista, military officers in
Marikina, led by Col. Hermogenes Bautista
(known as Menes), second overall
commander of the Third Zone of Manila
Defense, together with Lt. Col Doroteo
Lopez, Engineer of 3rd Zone Battalion, and
additional
16
officers,
submitted
themselves to the American authority. As a
result, fifteen (15) weapons were captured
in March 1901, as reported by the
Americans (U.S. War Department, Annual
Reports of the War Department 205).
The fall of Col. Bautista encouraged the
civilian leaders of San Mateo to negotiate
with Gen. Geronimo. On 21 March, the
General received a letter from civilians
urging him to cooperate with the
Americans. Upon reflecting on the
situation, Geronimo acknowledged the
appeal if Arturo Dancel, a former comrade
in the Philippine Revolution and the future
Governor of Rizal Province, would
intervene. Other prominent local leaders

who had previously cooperated with the
Americans also mediated. These are Dr.
Sixto de los Angeles (known in Philippine
history as the "Father of Forensic
Investigation" and the future Head of Rizal
Provincial Health and Sanitation Board in
1902), Lucas Santiago (Future Judge of San
Mateo Municipal Trial Court in 1901), and
Ismael Amado (future Local President of
San Mateo). On 28 March 1901, a meeting
was held in Baryo Guinayang (a barrio
between San Mateo and Montalban) to plan
for the ceremony of surrender. The next
day, at precisely 2:00 PM on 29 March 1901,
Geronimo, with Capt. Jose Reyes
(Adjutant), Lt. Antonio Raymundo
(Secretary-Adjutant), Aniceto Soriano
(Battalion Engineer), Lt. Estanislao Valerio,
Leodegario Eva, Canuto Estrella, Angel
Quines, Juan Montano, Jose de los Santos
and Domingo Francisco, took his oath of
allegiance to the American flag in the Plaza
of San Mateo (Rivera 21-23). Filipinos
surrendered a total of 15 officers, 40 men,
49 rifles, and three revolvers in San Mateo
in March 1901 (U.S. War Department,
Annual Reports of the War Department 207).
Two arguments can be advanced due to
Geronimo's surrender and his subsequent
cooperation to maintain the American
brand of peace and order. On the one hand,
his submission to the American flag and his
later stint as Inspector of the Philippine
Constabulary (P.C.) support the idea that,
borrowing the words of Ileto, "the war of
resistance was a waste of effort, an event
that was best forgotten" (Ileto, "Colonial
Wars" 105; emphasis added). Below is the
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summary of Geronimo's colorful record as
Inspector of the P.C.:
Table 3: Record of Licerio Geronimo as Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary
Date

Notable Achievements as Inspector of P.C.

3 April 1901

Capture one Filipino Captain, four lieutenants, and one
soldier on 3 April, 1901.

7 July 1902

Geronimo apprehended Domingo Moriones (Minister of
War), Aguedo del Rosario (Minister of Fomento), and five
other soldiers of the newly revived Katipunan in
Marikina.

8 February 1903

Together with Lt. Schermerhorn, Lt. McIlvaine, and Lt.
Harris, Geronimo attacked the headquarters of Gen.
Luciano San Miguel in Koral-na-Bato, Marikina. Gen. San
Miguel would die a month after (27 March 1903) and
became the 2nd Filipino general who was killed in action.

10 June 1903

Insp. Geronimo captured Col. Faustino Guillermo. The
two former comrades met thrice before this last arrest: 1)
when the Filipino colonel was arrested and detained in
San Mateo; 2) On 16 July 1902, when the colonel attacked
the Inspector's headquarters in Bago Bantay in Diliman
Country (Guillermo got away wearing the uniform of
Geronimo and attacked the headquarters of Sgt Omano
in San Jose, Bulacan later that evening); and 3) On 8
February 1903, when the Inspector attacked the
headquarters of Gen. San Miguel in Koral-na-Bato in
Marikina. Guillermo was executed on 20 May 1904
because of the crime of bandolerismo.

SOURCE: Herald Ian C. Guiwa, Mga Labanan sa San Mateo (1899-1901): Lunan ng Kolektibong
Gunita, Kasaysayan at Kabayanihan, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines Diliman, 2019.

With his contributions to the American
pacification campaigns, Geronimo, the
quintessential revolutionary leader in
Marikina Valley since 1892 and the Filipino
General whom the Americans despised for
killing their beloved Gen. Henry W.
Lawton, the only American General who
died during the Filipino-American War
(see appendix), was now dubbed as the

“most honest, straightforward native that
they [Americans] have ever known”
(McCoy 91). Tracking and arresting his old
comrades under the guise of “benevolent
pacification” appeared that he had already
imbibed the colonial labels (i.e., insurgents,
robbers, bandits) to Filipinos. More
importantly, Geronimo’s surrender and
collaboration became in conjunction with
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the American narrative of the war as a
“great misunderstanding” to the good
intention of the U.S. government (Barrows,
295; Ileto, “Friendship and Forgetting” 4)
because of the American production of his
image of enlightened and civilized man
after
the
surrender
(“Geronimo’s
Surrender” 3; “General Geronimo” 140).
No wonder his followers were not so eager
to transmit their memories of the war
because of the irony he exemplified—that
“progress
and
modernity”
were
guaranteed under the American regime.
Such perspective, however, simplified the
complexity of the phenomenon of
complicity, and it only broadens the
misinformation about history. The term
surrender and collaboration must not be
taken at face value, but rather a closer look
beyond such acts is necessary (Ileto,
"Colonial Wars" 115). This is the second
point we can observe from the case of
Geronimo's surrender. His acceptance of
the colonial order must be anchored in the
context of destruction and survival:
suffering fellow citizens, interrupted
agricultural activities, and the prospect of
famine. Contemplating on his surrender,
Geronimo remembered in an interview his
reasons for giving up his fight—that he
intended to liberate his imprisoned men
and that he was willing to lay down his
arms without payment for the sake of his
people (Rivera, 23; Guiwa 237).
On the other hand, his collaboration might
have reflected the change in Filipino
military strategy from guerrilla resistance
to “amigo warfare.”6 The fact that his

loyalty became doubtful when the
Americans investigated him due to alleged
secret meetings with remaining soldiers of
the Philippine Republic in 1902 ("Has
Geronimo Turned Ladrone" 4) and arms
smuggling in Polillo Island, Quezon
Province in 1909 (McCoy 184) made his
surrender more mystifying.7 An in-depth
discussion of amigo warfare in future
studies would elucidate Geronimo's case
and the collaboration of Filipinos during
the entire colonial regime. (Ileto, "Colonial
Wars" 7). Likewise, further research is
necessary on the concept of complicity, visà-vis the concept of misrecognition in
Bourdieusian sense, because the dominated
(Filipinos) must have maintained conscious
discourse or interrogation, a subtle protest,
on the social order established by the
dominant (Americans). After all, the
Filipino-American War would continue for
more than a decade.

CONCLUSION
The forgetting of the Filipino-American
War as a complex phenomenon did not
occur solely because of the gap in time, lack
of sources, and competing perspectives of
contemporary historians. The social and
political events during the war had also
affected how we remember or forget this
critical milestone in Philippine history.
With Pierre Bourdieu's misrecognition as a
form of forgetting, which Tupas articulated
in his article, the present study revealed
that establishing the American protected
zone in San Mateo influenced its
townspeople to forget, bury, and forgo
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their overt resistance against American
imperialism.
As
a
venue
where
unquestioned power relations were
apparent between the dominant and the
dominated, the Americans succeeded in
cementing their authority, not so much
with physical but rather by symbolical
"violent" methods. They just needed to
impose their policy/law alongside their
derogatory classifications of who is on the
"good" side and who is on the "evil"—this
was grounded, of course, on their racism
and
prejudice
to
Filipinos—every
accusation
and
judgment
became
legitimate. Therefore, the protected zones,
as in the words of Ileto, enabled the
Americans to "turn destruction into
redemption" (Ileto, "Colonial Wars" 115).
Nonetheless,
the
active
complicity
rendered by the town's citizens made the
imposition of symbolic violence seem
successful. The surrender of Geronimo and
other local leaders was indeed influential in
the process of forgetting. However,
focusing the discourse on the cases of
misrecognition of townsfolk would expand
our understanding of the causes of
collective amnesia. These citizens, who
could not burden themselves anymore of
the destructions brought by the war, were
also the ones who welcomed the new order
and embraced the prospect of assured
peace, order, and prosperity promised by
the imperialists. Thus, their misrecognition
of the symbolic violence imposed by the
Americans stimulated forgetting of the
Filipino-American War.

The study on the concept of forgetting, a
misrecognition
which
was
done
collectively, anchored in the structure of
the society, and socially practiced,
however, would not be complete if the
attention is fixed to the established
protected zones and surrender and
collaboration of local leaders. It is,
therefore, crucial to broaden the scope of
the study by interrogating other cases of
misrecognition,
vis-a-vis
symbolic
violence, on local levels— such as
education system (textbook used in
schools), policies of modernity and
development (sanitation and infrastructure
programs), and other invented traditions
(public holidays and commemorations).
Moreover, it is also vital to analyze how
Filipinos manifest their subtle protests
since human agency is still a factor in any
situation. Besides, the war would last for
more than a decade. Only then can we
achieve a comprehensive and fitting
remembrance of this crucial period in our
history.
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APPENDIX
Battles is San Mateo during the Filipino-American War
Battle/Skirmish
1. 31 March 1899

2. 12 August 1899

3. 19 December 1899

Filipino Side
Presumably led by Gen.
Licerio I. Geronimo and
Col. Hermogenes Baustista
Gen. Licerio I. Geronimo
led the combined troops of
Marikina, San Mateo and
Montalban. Soldiers from
Pangasinan also
participated.

Led by Gen. Licerio
Geronimo, Col.
Hermogenes Baustista and
Capt. Celedonio Salamat

4. 24 August 1900

Natives of San Mateo

5. 15 September 1900

Natives of San Mateo

6. 16 September 1900

Natives of San Mateo

7. 20 September 1900

Natives of San Mateo

American Side

Notable Information

Led by Brig. Gen. Robert
Hall and Col. Henry McCoy

"Running Battle"

Led by Brig. Gen. Samuel
Young, Capt. James Parker,
Maj. Marcus Cronin, and
Capt. Tyree Rivers

The Americans captured the town
but decided to leave when they
failed to maintain a garrison due to
lack of men.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton
(commander of the 1st
Division of the 8th Army
Corps), Col. James Lockett
and Lt.Col. Herbert Sargent
led the 11th Cavalry, 27th
Infantry and 29th Infantry,
U.S. Volunteers.

Filipino soldiers shot Maj. Gen.
Lawton. He was the only American
General who died during the
Filipino-American
War.
This
incident was highly romanticized,
which made this event the only
surviving "Battle of San Mateo" in
popular consciousness, even today.

Soldiers from 27th Infantry,
U.S. Volunteers

Guerilla/Amigo Warfare. After the
battle, accused natives were
arrested, tried, and charged guilty to
the violations against American
imposed laws of war.

Capt. Curry and soldiers
from 27th Infantry, U.S.
Volunteers
Lt. Charles Carpenter and
soldiers from 27th Infantry,
U.S. Volunteers
Capt. F. Graham, Lt.
Hennessy and soldiers from
27th Infantry, U.S.
Volunteers

Guerilla Warfare.

Guerilla Warfare.
Two Filipino officers, Capt. Miguel
Resurrection and Lt. Mariano
Domingo, were killed in action.
Thirty-eight (38) huts were burned
after the encounter.

SOURCE: Herald Ian C. Guiwa, Mga Labanan sa San Mateo (1899-1901): Lunan ng Kolektibong
Gunita, Kasaysayan at Kabayanihan, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines Diliman, 2019.
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The historian Renato Constantino once argued that “there is
no source, no matter how biased, that does not yield a bit of
historical truth,” in Constantino, “Historical Truths from
Biased Sources” ix.
1

The author discussed the other factors in his master’s thesis,
titled “Mga Labanan sa San Mateo (1899-1901): Lunan ng
Kolektibong Gunita, Kasaysayan at Kabayanihan,”
University of the Philippines Diliman, 2019.
2

Before the enactment of the Reconcentration Act in 1903,
which further intensified the anti-insurgency campaign of the
Americans, protected zones or reconcentration camps were
organized elsewhere in Southern Tagalog as early as 1901; in
Ileto, "Colonial Wars" 113.
3

The symbolic violence of the American justice system (e.g.,
written law, law enforcement, trial, and judgment), or the
misrecognition of the existence of the war of independence,
reduced all the resistance to the American invaders to
banditry and religious fanaticism, especially when the
Americans declared victory against the Filipinos in 1902. This
perspective may elucidate the unfortunate case of Macario
4

Sakay, Luciano San Miguel, Faustino Guillermo, and other
soldiers of the Philippine Republic who were branded as
"villains" in history; read Orlino A. Ochosa, Bandoleros:
outlawed guerrillas of the Philippine-American war 1903-1907
(Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers of the
Christian Literature Society of the Philippines, 1995).
This setup became a recurring theme for those American
officers accused of any crimes. American officers "accorded
more leniency" because they are "gentlemen who deserved
the benefit of any doubts;" in Welch, Jr. 240.
5

Amigo is the Spanish term for "Friend". Amigo warfare is the
Filipino military strategy wherein Filipinos disguised as
civilians living within the pacified communities, but in
reality, they were guerrilla soldiers who wait for an
opportunity to attack their enemies; in Gates 257; Ileto,
"Colonial Wars" 110.
6

A year before his surrender, Gen. Licerio Geronimo insisted
that he would never betray his country, and all accusations
against him are “great falsehood.” In Geronimo, PIR Roll 33,
Folder 582.11.
7
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